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Abstract: 
In this paper the differences between traditional economic theory and the relatively newer behavioral 
economic theory, which is a blend of economics and psychology, is discussed. The traditional assumptions 
regarding consumer preferences are explained and elaborated upon. This includes reflexivity, completeness, 
transitivity and continuity. Auxiliary assumptions, such as local nonsatiation and strict convexity, regarding 
preferences are also introduced. Lexicographic preferences in a two good world are explicated and 
demonstrated to encompass rational behavior even though they do not generate a well defined utility function. 
If a consumer has lexicographic preferences behavioral economists can be mistaken in thinking that 
consumer behavior is irrational. 
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Introduction 
The traditional view in economics assumes that individual decision makers such as consumers and managers within 
business firms act in a rational manner while trying to optimize an unconstrained or constrained objective function. This 
maximizing (or minimizing) behavior is assumed to occur across all individuals. Rationality is a key assumption in any 
optimization situation. With regard to consumer preferences the traditional assumptions include reflexivity, 
completeness, transitivity, and continuity. Throughout this paper it will be assumed that we have a two good world 
consisting of goods x1 and x2. The consumption bundle will be shown as a bold typed x, such as x, x’ or x”. The entire set 
of consumption bundles is shown as X. Reflexivity states that for all consumption bundles in X, x ≿ x (where ≿ means 
weakly preferred to, ≻ means strictly preferred to). This is an inconsequential assumption. Completeness assumes that 
for all x and x’ in X either x ≿ x’ or x’ ≿ x or both. This implies that consumers are not paralyzed by indecision, they can 
easily make choices. Transitivity assumes that for all consumption bundles in X, if x ≿ x’ and x’ ≿ x” then x ≿ x”. This 
implies that there is a logical consistency present in preferences. Continuity implies that the set of strictly preferred 
consumption bundles is an open set and the set of weakly preferred consumption bundles is a closed set. This also means 
that thick indifference curves are ruled out. With these four assumptions it can be shown that an ordinal utility function 
exists.  
Other assumptions that are sometimes made regarding preferences are local nonsatiation, strong monotonicity (which 
implies local nonsatiation) and strict convexity. The first two imply, independently, that more is always preferred to less. 
A good never becomes a “bad” in other words. Strict convexity is used to generate smooth looking demand curves. It 
incorporates the ides of diminishing marginal rates of substitution. 
Behavioral Economics 
The relatively new fields of behavioral economics and behavioral finance take issue with the traditional type of models. 
Behavioral economics is a blend of economics and psychology. The adherents to these fields believe that decision makers 
do not always behave in a rational manner and thus the models that make that assumption are faulty and can lead to 
incorrect conclusions about actual behavior in markets. Behavioral economists make use of a small set of beliefs that 
include prospect theory, framing, and endowment effects. 
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The behavioral economists point to a variety of anecdotal situations (many contrived in a laboratory type setting) where 
individuals do not make optimizing decisions. This is supposedly due to the irrationality of the agent making the 
decision. Some examples of their work follow below. 
Classical economics assumes that individuals make decisions based on the well-known expected utility theory. 
Behavioral economists claim otherwise. They developed a theory called prospect theory that, in their mind, better 
explains the decisions made by individuals. Prospect theory assumes that a value function exist that plots utility on the 
vertical axis and gains/losses on the horizontal axis. The function itself is cubic and crosses the origin. In quadrant three 
(losses and less utility) of this Cartesian plane the function is increasing at an increasing rate. In quadrant one (gains and 
more utility) the function is increasing at a decreasing rate. This assumes that a $100 loss takes away more utility than a 
$100 gain would add. This phenomenon is entitled loss aversion.  
Behavioral economists have devised a number of different studies regarding loss aversion. The typical study asks 
individuals to choose between a sure gain of say $200 (option A) or a 50% chance of gaining $400 and a 50% to 
gain/lose $0 (option B). The expected value of option B is $200. Most studies show the majority of individuals choosing 
option A. A similar question is then posed such as option A being a sure loss of $200 and option B being a 50% chance 
to lose $400 and a 50% chance to lose/gain $0. Again the expected value of option B is $200. Here most people choose 
option B. In the first case individuals demonstrate risk averse behavior as predicted by traditional economics, but in the 
second situation they exhibit risk seeking behavior which is not rational according to traditional theory. Behavioral 
economics point to this as evidence backing up their prospect theory which is based on their assumption of loss aversion 
which fuels the shape of their value function explained above. 
The field of behavioral economics utilizes a different concept of utility than does the traditional school of thought. 
Behavioral economists break utility into two different types: acquisition utility and transactional utility. Acquisition 
utility is similar to the concept of consumer surplus used by traditional economists. Transactional utility is the difference 
between some reference price which consumers identify as the “normal” price and the price they are actually expected to 
pay. This suggests that business firms can impact sales simply by framing the reference price in an advantageous manner. 
For example, by inflating the suggested retail price (reference price) they can trick consumers into thinking they are 
getting more transactional utility even though the good itself has not changed. This would, according to the behavioral 
school of thought, cause sales to rise. The behavior is viewed as an irrational decision by consumers.   
Consumers are also thought to behave irrationally when making intertemporal choices. According to the “behavioralists”, 
consumers and investors do not discount in a rational manner. The list goes on and on as far as examples of supposed 
irrational behavior by agents in markets. Behavioral economics produces much anecdotal “evidence”, but no concrete, 
general theories.  
Lexicographic Preferences 
Perhaps no general theories exist because behavioral economics is itself faulty. If individual agents making decisions 
have non-traditional looking indifference curves due to a variety of different reasons then the decisions that they make 
might not actually be irrational at all. They might be quite rational and quite adaptive to explanations via traditional 
economic theory. One such case is when individuals have lexicographic preferences or modified forms of lexicographic 
preferences. 
Lexicographic preferences exist when x, consisting of two goods x1 and x2, and x’, consisting of x1’ and x2’ have the 
following relationship. x is lexicographically weakly preferred to x’ (x ≿ x’) if and only if either x1 > x1’ or x1 = x1’ and 
x2 > x2’. The strong version would simply be x ≻ x’ if and only if x1 > x1’ or x1 = x1’ and x2 > x2’. Lexicographic 
preferences are reflexive, complete and transitive. The preferences also reflect local nonsatiation, strong monotonicity 
and strict convexity. These preferences do however lack continuity and thus cannot be represented by any discernable 
utility function. The lack of continuity implies that in a two good world the upper contour set is neither closed nor open 
and thus no significant indifference map exist. Indifference curves would only be shown when the upper contour set is 
closed. Each unique combination of any two goods would have a different level of utility. The lack of the existence of a 
utility function does not mean that individuals cannot make decisions among various consumption bundles. They indeed 
can and do. Kohli and Jedidi (2007) find considerable evidence that consumers exhibit various degrees of lexicographic 
preferences. Their preferences still are reflexive, complete, transitive, monotonic and convex. 
An example of lexicographic preferences is as follows. Assume a consumer is deciding between two goods, x1 being red 
M&M’s and x2 being green M&M’s. Further assume that the consumer has lexicographic preferences such that the 
consumer prefers more M&M’s to less M&M’s and the consumer has a preference of red over green M&M’s. Hence (x1, 
x2) ≿ (x1’ x2’) if either (x1 + x2 > x1’ + x2’) or (x1 + x2 = x1’ + x2’ and x1 > x1’) holds. Also assume a consumer with a 
“normal” utility function which exhibits continuity among the other usual assumptions of completeness, transitivity and 
local no satiation. This function can take a simple additive form such as U = x1 + x2. Further assume that red and green 
M&M’s can be purchased separately and the price of each kind of M&M is identical. This implies that the indifference 
curves for this consumer would be identical to their budget lines. Numerous utility maximizing choices exist in this 
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situation. Assuming each utility maximizing consumption bundle would have an equal probability of being chosen it 
would be extremely rare to have a corner solution where all of one type of M&M is chosen. An economist would have 
expectations of a consumer choosing some combination of red and green M&M’s in this case although it is possible to 
see a consumer choosing all red or all green M&M’s. This would be especially true if we assumed a market for M&M’s 
with all consumers having the same additive utility function. It approaches a probability of zero that all consumers would 
end up with the same corner solution. Yet if all consumers had lexicographic preferences like the one above we in fact 
would see all consumers purchasing red M&M’s in this case. A behavioral economist seeing such behavior would 
suggest that the consumers are irrational when in fact they are not. As suggested above, evidence found by Kohli and 
Jedidi (2007) seems to indicate that lexicographic preferences are not as rare as one might think. 
Even if prices were not exactly equal, situations could be imagined where if relative prices were near unity and 
individuals had slightly “thick” indifference curves (implying that preferences were not strictly continuous) then the same 
market choices above could prevail. The identical mistakes could then be made by behavioral economists. 
Conclusion 
It might be the case that where behavioral economists think they are seeing irrational behavior might simply be a case 
where individuals are exhibiting quite rational behavior which is somewhat masked by having lexicographic preferences 
instead of the more standard preferences normally assumed in economics and finance. This is especially true when the 
relative price ratio of the two goods is near unity. The presence of a utility function implies rationality, but it is not a 
necessary condition for rationality.  
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